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ABSTRACT: Currently, accounting firms have become the target of
the investors and creditors of failing or bankrupt companies.
Under the legal doctrine of joint and several liability, auditors
are being brought to court not because they are at fault for poor
investment decisions but because they are the only defendants
with "deep pockets." The highly litigious atmosphere surrounding
the public accounting profession is creating an adverse impact on
public accounting firms and the U.S. economy. Tort reform is
necessary if the accounting profession is going to continue to
thrive. By conducting research with professional journals and
interviewing professionals, I explored the possible remedies for
the present litigation crisis. Replacing joint and several
liability with proportionate liability is one of the more popular
proposals. Other proposed reforms include enacting the privity
standard, altering the audit function, and allowing for public
accounting firms to incorporate. All proposals must be
individually examined and the best ones made into laws because
tort reform is no longer a matter of consideration for public
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INTRODUCTION
Presently, the public accounting profession is being plagued
with a seemingly endless stream of lawsuits. The litigation
facing public accounting firms is an area of major concern;
however, a much larger problem lies in the fact that many of
these lawsuits are without merit. The stockholders and creditors
of failing or bankrupt companies are attempting to recover losses
incurred on the basis of poor decision making by targeting the
auditors who are often the only "deep pocket" defendants. In an
effort to avoid paying ridiculously high judgements and
additional legal fees, many public accounting firms are being
forced to make settlements on these cases. If this practice
tit continues, the survival of the public accounting profession will
be seriously threatened.
In order to preserve the public accounting profession, the
u.s. legal system must be reformed and the expectation gap
between the auditors of financial statements and the users of the
financial statements must be narrowed. Several reforms have been
proposed by members of the accounting profession that would help
to alleviate the current liability plague. The reform with the
greatest support of the public accounting profession is
proportionate liability. By eliminating joint and several
liability and enacting proportionate liability, auditors would
have to pay judgements only to the degree to which they are at
fault. A second reform would be to enact the privity standard
4It which would greatly limit the auditor's liability to nonclient
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third parties. Having the plaintiffs pay the defendants legal
fees in failed claims is another of the proposed reforms that aim
to eliminate unwarranted lawsuits. Another suggestion is to
change the audit function to include qualitative disclosures,
financial analysis of the future, and value-based financial
statements. By altering the audit function to include these
elements, the expectation gap would be lessened. A final reform
would allow for the incorporation of public accounting firms and
thus, for the protection of the public accounting partners'
personal assets.
None of these proposed reforms would entirely eliminate the
liability crisis. Additionally, none of the reforms are without
~
their faults or weaknesses. Nonetheless, the liability crisis
plaguing the public accounting profession must be addressed and
proposing these reforms is a step in the right direction. The
implementation of any of the proposed reforms will be a long and
laborious task. However, it is now a necessary task if the
accounting profession is to be preserved and trust in the audit
function is to be restored.
THE LITIGATION CRISIS
The present epidemic of litigation that is plaguing the
public accounting profession is threatening the independent audit
function, the financial reporting system, and the economy of the
United States. In the fiscal year 1991, $477 million was spent
8 by public accounting firms to settle and defend lawsuits. This
enormous figure represents an increase of $73 million over the
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1990 figure of $404 million (Arthur Andersen & Co. 1992). If
this present crisis is to subside, the expectation gap between
auditors and the public must be reconciled. An agreement must be
reached so that the public will receive the information they want
from auditors without imposing an unbearable amount of
responsibility on the auditors.
Unfortunately, the expectation gap has had an adverse impact
on the public accounting profession. The high cost of
settlements and legal fees has driven liability insurance for
public accounting firms to heights so unbearable that many
smaller public accounting firms cannot afford their annual
premiums. In addition, public accounting firms are being
8 extremely selective when accepting new clients so as to reduce
their risk of litigation. Finally, the present litigious
atmosphere is detering students from choosing accounting as a
profession and is making it hard for public accounting firms to
attract new recruits. The world of corporate accounting appears
far more attractive at this time as corporate accountants'
exposure to liability is much less than public accountants' .
THE EXPECTATION GAP
Much of the impending litigation against accounting firms
arises from what is known as the expectation gap. The
expectation gap results from a discrepancy between what the
public perceives the auditors' responsibilities to be and what
8 the auditors believe their responsibilites are. In a Wall Street
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Journal survey of 500 CPAs in public accounting firms of 50 or
more accountants, ninety-two percent of the accountants believed
their responsibilities were limited to ensuring financial
statement accuracy. Seventy-seven percent of the accountants
surveyed said the limits of their responsibilities included the
independent evaluation of a company's financial situation.
Finally, only three percent of the CPAs believed that they were
responsible for guaranteeing a company's financial stability
(Berton 1992). Unfortunately for the accountants, society tends
to agree with the small three percent of the surveyed accountants
in believing that an unqualified opinion attached to a company's
financial statements is a guarantee of the company's future
8 financial stability. On the contrary, a company with a net loss
can receive an unqualified opinion.
An unqualified opinion merely indicates that the company's
financial statements present fairly, in all material aspects, the
financial position of a company, in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles. The unqualified opinion makes no
judgement on that financial position or as to whether or not the
company would make a good investment. The expectation gap
originates from the prevelant misconception that an auditor's
opinion is a guarantee of a company's financial security.
Therefore, when a company that has received an unqualified
opinion fails, the auditors often get targeted in lawsuits by
investors who feel the auditors have not upheld their end of the
tt bargain.
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THE LAWSUITS' IMPACT ON ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND THE ECONOMY
The growing number of lawsuits against public accounting
firms is creating an adverse impact on both the firms themselves
and the U.S. economy. Naturally, these lawsuits are going to
hurt the public accounting firms financially. According to a
statement of position issued by the Big Six accounting firms,
which consist of Arthur Andersen & Co., Coopers and Lybrand,
Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and
Price Waterhouse, the average claim against the public accountant
in fiscal year 1991 averaged $85 million. Settling the case
outside of court averaged $2.7 million, which is only 3% of the
average claim - an indicator that the amount of the original
8 claim was most likely unwarranted. Lastly, the average legal
fees for each claim were $3.5 million (Arthur Andersen & Co.
1992). The cost to settle and defend lawsuits in 1991 amounted
to 9% of auditing revenues and 16% of partners' capital of the
Big Six firms.
Furthermore, the costs incurred in these lawsuits are
driving liability insurance costs to ridiculous heights. An
estimated 40% of U.S. public accounting firms are without
liability insurance simply because the annual premiums are just
too expensive. Since 1985, insurance premiums have risen by 300%
and deductibles have risen by 600% (Arthur Andersen & Co. 1992).
In order to cover the costs of settlements, legal fees, and
liability insurance, public accounting firms must raise their
tt audit fees. In addition to raising their audit fees, public
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accounting firms are being very cautious in selecting audit
clients. Many are taking defensive measures by screening
prospective clients and "weeding out" high-risk clients. Clients
that do business in high-risk industries, that are in financial
trouble, or that are involved in suspicious activities are
usually avoided. Also, those clients who have a reputation of
being uncooperative, who have been involved in many lawsuits, or
who have switched accountants frequently in the past years should
be looked upon with extreme caution. Today, many accounting
firms will not audit companies that appear to have "trouble
areas" because the risk of lawsuits is too high, whereas two
decades ago, virtually any company would have been audited by a
8 public accounting firm. Some of the smaller public accounting
firms do not perform audits at all these days due to the high
risk of litigation.
Those public accounting firms that still do perform audits
are taking a number of actions to decrease their risk of
liability according to the Wall Street Journal survey. All of
the surveyed firms are performing internal professional reviews
of their audit work. Ninety-eight percent of the firms are
implementing new risk management procedures by defining the scope
of the CPA's job within engagement letters to their audit
clients. Also, ninety-eight percent are upgrading their internal
control standards. Additionally, eighty-seven percent include in
their opinions disclaimers that identify the appropriate use of




accounting firms surveyed are limiting the services they offer
and fifty-six percent are limiting the industries they will serve
(Berton 1992). Overall, public accounting firms are implementing
new programs to minimize their risk of litigation.
The most extreme impact of the litigation stampede against
public accounting firms can be witnessed by the 1990 demise of
Laventhol and Horwath, once the seventh largest public accounting
firm in the United States. In describing the firm's collapse,
former Laventhol and Horwath CEO Robert Levine said, "It wasn't
the litigation we would lose that was the problem. It was the
cost of winning that caused the greatest part of our financial
distress." (Arthur Andersen & Co. 1992)
If these seemingly unwarranted claims against public
accounting firms do not cease, the existence of the accounting
profession is not the only thing that will be at stake, but the
entire U.S. economy will be in jeopardy. Who would perform the
necessary audit function if public accounting firms are forced
into bankruptcy as a result of uncontrollable litigation? The
Big Six accounting firms are responsible for auditing 494 of the
Fortune 500 industrial companies as well as ninety percent of
publicly-traded companies with annual revenues in excess of one
million dollars (Arthur Andersen & Co. 1992). Without proper
audits to inspect the validity, accuracy, and completeness of
companies' financial statements, the U.S. economy would be in a
state of disarray.
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THE ACCOUNTING FIRMS' RESPONSE TO THE LITIGATION CRISIS
It should now be obvious that the enormous number of
lawsuits against auditors, whether legitimate or not, are taking
their toll on public accounting firms of all sizes. For the
first time ever, the Big Six accounting firms and the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants have joined forces by
creating the Coalition to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits.
The coalition is lobbying Congress for a change in securities
laws that would replace joint and several liability with
proportionate liability for professional organizations. Their
lobbying efforts also include a proposal that would require the
plaintiff's lawyers to pay the defendant's legal fees if they
tt lose their case. Other reforms aimed at easing the escalating
liability crisis have been suggested by different organizations
and individuals.
Each proposition has its advantages and disadvantages and
should be examined individually to decide whether the benefits of
the proposal outweigh the costs.
PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY
As was mentioned earlier, the reform with the greatest
backing among public accountants is proportionate liability
(Telberg 1992). Joint and several liability makes auditors easy
targets for lawsuits since this legal doctrine may require the
auditors to pay the entire amount of a judgement even if they are
~
only partly responsible for the damages. Joint and several
liability makes several defendants jointly responsible for paying
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the entire judgement in a liability case. For example, if a
plaintiff, such as a creditor, were to sue a financially troubled
corporation, which was 80% liable for losses incurred, and its
auditors, who were liable for the other 20% of the losses
incurred, the auditors would have to pay for 100% of the damages
if the corporation had no money. Therefore, joint and several
liability makes the auditors responsible for 100% of the
judgement regardless of their degree of culpability. It is no
wonder that "deep pocket" defendants, such as auditors, are
included in almost all of the lawsuits involving financially
troubled or bankrupt companies, since under the doctrine of joint
and several liability plaintiffs most likely will be able to
8 collect the entire judgement if they win.
Clearly, the doctrine of joint and several liability is
unfair towards the auditors because the auditors end up paying
all or a percentage of the damages far greater than that for
which they are responsible. On the other hand, proportionate
liability would allow the plaintiffs to recover damages from the
auditors but they could collect only the percentage of the
damages for which the auditors are liable. In the example above,
the auditors would only have to pay 20% of the damages under
proportionate liability despite the corporation's insolvency and
inability to pay the remaining 80% of the judgement.
Proportionate liability would not only bring back a sense of
8
equality and justice to the U.S. legal system but would also




recovering their entire losses from "deep pocket" defendants who
might be only partially at fault.
Admittedly, investors and creditors will not feel that
justice has been served under proportionate liability because
they may be able to recover only a portion of their losses.
However, some of the responsibility should fallon the shoulders
of the investors and creditors, and they should be accountable
for the business decisions they have made. It seems that
possibly these third parties do not have the right to recover all
of their losses from auditors who may be only marginally
responsible for incurring those losses. In this case then,
proportionate liability might be an answer to the problem.
Unfortunately, replacing joint and several liability with
proportionate liablity will not be an easy task. Lobbying
Congress to change laws is a long and tedious process.
Additionally, enacting proportionate liability for professional
organizations only, as the Coalition to Eliminate Abusive
Securities Suits is trying to do, is impractical. Instead, the
proportionate liability doctrine would have to include all facets
of society and not administer special treatment to professionals
only. However, in most instances, it only seems fair that
parties involved should pay only their proportionate share of
damages incurred, no more and no less. Thus, first priority
should be given to getting proportionate liability passed through
Congress despite the amount of frustration and time it may take.
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THE PRIVITY STANDARD
Another factor contributing to the litigation problem for
public accountants deals with the auditor's responsibility to
nonclient third parties. Naturally, auditors should be held
liable for their mistakes when they cause harm to a client.
However, how far does the auditor's responsibility extend beyond
the client? There exists an endless number of potential users of
the client's audited financial statements, leaving open the
possibility of an endless number of lawsuits against the auditors
if a legitimate mistake is made. It would seem unfair for the
auditors to be held accountable to the unlimited number of
nonclient third parties especially if the auditors do not
8 specifically know who will be using their client's audited
financial statements or for what specific purpose those
statements will be used. The concept of limiting lawsuits
against auditors to their actual clients is known as the privity
standard.
The privity standard is definitely beneficial for public
accountants since it would ease worries that unforeseen lawsuits
could arise from plaintiffs whose reliance on the financial
statements is unknown to the auditors. In addition, the privity
standard would prevent nonclient third parties from recovering
losses from the "deep pocket" auditors under the doctrine of
joint and several liability.
Nevertheless, as good as the privity standard may sound from
4It the public accountant's point of view, it can also be extremely
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detrimental to the accounting profession. The greatest argument
against the privity standard is that it makes the auditors look
like they do not want to be held responsible for their audit work
or for the mistakes that may have arisen from their audit.
Consequently, the public will lose faith in the audit function.
Nonclient third parties who use the audited financial statements
of other companies will have a genuine concern as to whether they
will be able to trust the accuracy and validity of the financial
statements if the auditors appear to be hiding from their
responsibilities.
An alternative to the privity standard would be to put a cap
on the amount for which a nonclient third party could sue an
~
auditor. This alternative would restore trust in the audit
function and would prevent auditors from paying judgements
totally out of proportion to their degree of responsibility to
those unknown third parties. If a claim against the auditors
were limited to five times the audit fee, for instance,
ridiculous lawsuits such as the $338 million claim filed by
Standard Chartered Bank against Price Waterhouse would not be a
concern (Lochner 1992).
PLAINTIFFS PAYING THE DEFENDANT'S LEGAL FEES IN FAILED CLAIMS
In proposing these various reforms, the auditors are not
trying to shun their responsibilities or dismiss cases in which
the auditors made a legitimate error. Instead, as stated in a
8 statement of position issued by the Big Six accounting firms,
"the firms seek equitable treatment that will permit them and the
Although the practice of recovering legal fees from the
plaintiff in failed claims would decrease the amount of
questionable cases against auditors, it would also scare
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public accounting profession to continue to make an important
contribution to the U.S. economy." (Arthur Andersen & Co. 1992)
Making the plaintiff pay for the defendant's legal fees in failed
claims is one way the Big Six firms believe they will receive
equitable treatment. This proposal is aimed at putting an end to
the practice of including the "deep pocket" auditors in lawsuits
even when the auditors are marginally culpable or not responsible
for any losses whatsoever.
Presently, the U.S. legal system allows for the auditors to
be victimized by plaintiffs who are trying to recover their
losses from one of the few defendants with a substantial amount
of money left in the aftermath of a finacial failure. This
8 increasingly common practice is very costly for the public
accountants since they are usually forced to make settlements out
of court in order to prevent being exposed to more legal fees and
the possibility of paying for the entire court judgement even if
they are only marginally at fault. Having the plaintiff pay for
the defendant's legal fees in failed claims would make a
plaintiff think twice before bringing suit against an auditor.
It would also deter lawyers from accepting cases without any
merit.
plaintiffs with authentic claims from filing lawsuits.
8 Plaintiffs with little money would fear the financial
consequences of paying not only their own legal costs but also
the legal costs of the defendants if they should lose. The U.S.





to settle their grievances in court.
However, this proposed
reform may make it advantageous only for plaintiffs with
substantial financial backing to bring their cases to court.
One way of achieving the same goal and retaining equal
opportunity in the U.S. courts would be the creation of a
"triage" system based on merit for all cases brought before the
courts. Under the "triage" system, trivial cases with claims of
questionable quality would be immediately dismissed allowing for
cases of more importance and credibility to be heard.
CHANGES TO THE AUDIT FUNCTION
As mentioned previously, the increasing amount of litigation
against public accounting firms stems, in part, from the
expectation gap. Society expects more than an opinion from
auditors but the auditors do not want to be held responsible for
anything more than issuing an opinion. In order to curb the
growing number of unreasonable lawsuits against auditors and to
restore faith in the audit function, certain accounting
procedures and the audit itself could be altered to meet public
expectations.
Value-Based Financial Statements
One potential change to the audit function might be the
development of value-based financial statements. Currently, all
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financial statements are based upon historical costs and past
transactions. However, financial statements based on current
market values may be more valuable to financial statement users
especially in industries where historical costs may be outdated
quickly, such as real estate (Mednick 1991). Value-based
financial statements would be particularly helpful to investors
in predicting risk and the possible future values of certain
items. It should be noted that this reform does not propose to
replace historical cost-based financial statements with financial
statements based on current market values. Instead, the value-
based statements would supplement the historical cost statements.
Although value-based financial statements would be extremely
~
beneficial in predicting future values and assessing risk, the
process of determining the current value of all the items
presented in the financial statements would be difficult and
expensive. Since the management of a company most likely would
not have the needed expertise or capacity to make an independent
assessment on the current value of the company's assets and
liabilities, an outside appraiser would have to be hired to make
the valuations. Ultimately, the additional costs incurred in
issuing value-based financial statements would be absorbed by the
public. Whether or not these costs outweigh the benefits derived
from the value-based statements will have to be decided by the
public.
8
Also, an inherent risk involved in producing financial
statements based on current market values is the possibility that
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the information on those statements will quickly become obsolete
due to fluctuations in market values. Outside factors beyond the
control of management will cause market values to fluctuate
daily. Additionally, the degree of fluctuation is unpredictable
and could range from immaterial to significant. Thus, value-
based financial statements would be useful only for a short
period of time after they are issued.
Oualitative Disclosures
In conjunction with issuing value-based financial
statements, the public is demanding the inclusion of qualitative
disclosures in the financial statements as well as quantitative
~
disclosures. Qualitative disclosures would include items such as
managerial commentary, long-term strategic plans, and short-term
goals. Two-thirds of participants in a 1985 Lou Harris and
Associates survey for the Financial Accounting Standards Board
agreed that "qualitative information presented outside the
financial statements...often can be more useful than quantitative
measures included in the financial statements." (Mednick 1991)
The qualitative disclosures may, indeed, be extremely valuable in
predicting the future financial condition of a company. The
inclusion of new research developments, new products, market
growth, and other performance indicators in financial statements
may be more informative and meaningful to the public than
historical cost financial statements.
8
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Like value-based financial statements, the additional costs
incurred in gathering and issuing qualitative disclosures will
have to be paid by the public. Also, although the inclusion of
qualitative disclosures in the financial statements undoubtedly
would be useful in assessing the future financial condition of a
company, the information contained in the qualitative disclosures
could not be trusted entirely. There is no guarantee that what
management says in these disclosures will be exactly what
management does. External influences may also contribute to the
alteration of some of management's short-term goals or long-term
stategic plans. Additionally, managers are usually hesitant
about disclosing strategic plans to the public since competitors
8 would also have access to these disclosures. Consequently, one
must consider these risks when making decisions based on
qualitative disclosures.
Financial Analvsis of the Future
The final recommended change in accounting and auditing
procedures also accomodates the public's growing need for more
predictive information. As a guide to making more informed
investment decisions, a financial analysis of a company's future
could be provided to shareholders. Public accountants already
conduct thorough financial analyses of prospective acquisitions
for clients. Making this type of critical financial analysis
part of the traditional audit may be useful. It would also
8 expose problem areas and provide early warning signals to
management and shareholders alike.
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As with all of the proposed reforms, there are risks and
drawbacks associated with financially analyzing a company's
future. First, predicting the future results of a company's
operations is very difficult and requires careful judgement on
the part of the accountant. Additionally, how would these
financial projections be audited? Although there are standards
for financial analysis, they are not as extensive or complete as
generally accepted auditing standards. Therefore, the
projections made during the financial analysis of a company may
be slightly exaggerated in favor of the company. Likewise, these
projections would have to be based partially on what management's
strategic plans for the future are. These plans may be altered
8 or not followed at all, thus, rendering the projections
potentially useless and inaccurate.
THE INCORPORATION OF ACCOUNTING FIRMS
Unfortunately, the highly litigious atmosphere surrounding
auditors has had damaging consequences on the accounting
profession and on the public itself. Society's present grim view
of auditors coupled with the fact that the liability of public
accounting partners extends beyond work to include their personal
assets has had a detrimental effect on morale and recruiting in
public accounting firms. Although allowing public accounting
firms to incorporate would not hinder lawsuits against the firms,
it would limit the personal liability of partners and restore
8 confidence in the accounting profession. Incorporation would




firms as they would not have to worry about losing their personal
assets for the alleged negligence of another partner during an
audit. However, critics of incorporation say that it is just one
more thing that the partners of a public accounting firm can hide
behind. Once again, public accountants are caught between a rock
and a hard place. They do not want to appear as if they are
shunning their responsibilities, but they do not want to risk
losing their personal assets every day they go to work.
TURNING PROPOSALS INTO LAWS
At this point, all of the reforms discussed are merely ideas
and not yet realities. If these proposals are to become
realities, three things will be necessary: contact with
legislators, support of public accountants, and large sums of
money. First, CPAs must be in constant contact with their
legislators. Every public accounting firm should appoint one or
two people from within their organization to remain in contact
with legislators on a regular basis. If these reforms are to
become laws, legislators must be aware of the existing problems
in the public accounting profession. They must also know the
severity and disastorous effects of the litigation crisis. Next,
large numbers of CPAs must back these proposed reforms. State
CPA societies must inform their members of current issues and
involve their members in the reform efforts. Finally, the
process of turning these proposals into law must be well funded.
Without proper funds, lobbying Congress will be ineffective and





"Today we are seriously threatened by a system out of
control." (Telberg 1992) This statement regarding an imbalanced
u.s. liablity system was made be Deloitte and Touche chairman
Mike Cook at the annual meeting of the National Association of
State Boards of Accountancy. It should now be clear that the
liability crisis faced by the public accounting profession is an
extremely serious issue. Addressing the severity of the problem,
Cooper and Lybrand's Gene Freedman asserted, "We know we have a
job to do and we haven't always been perfect. But our survival
is at stake." (Telberg 1992) With the survival of the accounting
profession at stake, tort reform seems to be inevitable if equity
is to be restored in u.s. ,courts. Although each proposed reform
does have some drawbacks, the U.S. liability system cannot
continue in the direction that it is presently heading without
inflicting serious damage on the public accounting profession and
the entire United States economy. Each proposed reform must be
individually examined and the best ones must be made into laws
because tort reform is no longer a matter of consideration for
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